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Editor’s note
The first issue of the Millennium also marks the start of
CentrePiece’s fifth year: and we are determined to
maintain – and even improve on – the high editorial
standards established in the first issue in 1996. 
The current issue returns to themes we have addressed in
the past – in particular, education and employment. 
Our cover story on overeducation might strike some
readers as odd - after all, aren’t poor educational
standards in Britain giving most cause for concern? 
Of course, they are: but as Steven McIntosh, Francis
Green and Anna Vignoles explain, the clear evidence of
overeducation suggests some misdirection of resources.
The central importance of education to government policy
is demonstrated by the decision to establish a new Centre
for the Economics of Education, funded by the Department
for Education and Employment. The new Centre is a joint
venture between the CEP, the Institute of Education and
the Institute for Fiscal Studies: it will be based here at the
CEP and Stephen Machin, its new Director, explains to
CentrePiece what the new Centre will do.
With unemployment in the UK continuing to show a steady
decline, Steve Nickell and Jan Van Ours examine why both
Britain and the Netherlands have been so successful in
reducing unemployment, especially compared with some
other European countries. Joanna Swaffield looks at a less
attractive feature of the labour market – the continuing
evidence of pay discrimination against women. 
On the management front, David Holman and Sue Fernie
report on new work completed on call centres – currently
the fastest growing employment sector in Britain. It seems
that people who work there aren’t as unhappy as some
commentators would have us believe. Stephen Wood
takes issue with some of his academic colleagues, 
arguing that the latest management theories aren’t yet
backed by enough clear evidence that they work. And
Richard Freeman looks at the prospects for the new form
of shared capitalism.
When CentrePiece first started the Internet was still a
mystery to most of us and few people predicted the scale
of the revolution that has taken place in the past few years.
It is a vindication of our decision to ask Danny Quah to
write a regular column: and in this issue he argues we
need have nothing to fear from the economic
transformation taking place.
So we start the new century with an issue crammed 
with thoughtful and provocative ideas: enjoy them – 
and let us know what you think. You can write to me at 
centrepiece@lse.ac.uk.
Graham Ingham
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 
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Can I help you?
Call centres and job satisfaction
They’ve been described as
electronic sweatshops, the dark
satanic mills of the 21st century;
some critics see them as battery
farms where humans are kept in
cells and force fed calls while
pecking at a key board. There’s
no shortage of arresting - and
uniformly negative - images both
in the academic and popular
press. It’s perhaps not surprising
then that the main effects of
these ‘sweatshop’ conditions on
employees are thought to be high
levels of stress and poor job
satisfaction, especially in
comparison with other jobs.
David Holman and Sue Fernie set
out to test these assumptions.
C
all centres are the fastest growing occupa-
tional sector in Britain, already employing
more than 400,000 people – almost 2% of
the working population. There’s no doubt that
for those of us who don’t work in them, call
centres conjure up an image of oppressive,
stifling working conditions, constant surveillance, poor job
satisfaction. 
But is this negative image deserved? Until now, very little
academic research has been conducted into this industrial
phenomenon, and almost none of it has focused on
employee well-being. We set out to fill in some of the gaps:
to find out whether call centre work is as unpleasant as
commentators suggest, and to discover what life in a call
centre is really like. Our findings were surprising.
Most accounts of call centres focus on the negative
characteristics that they are all assumed to share: repeti-
tive, short and boring calls; the need for call centre opera-
tors to follow a specific script; constant management
demands to handle calls quickly within a given time;
technology that enables management to monitor every
aspect of employee behaviour, including how calls are
handled and how long each call takes; and part-time and
short-term contracts allied to low pay. The implicit assump-
tion is that one call centre is pretty much like another, that
they are all managed in the same way. We wanted to test
this assumption. We also wanted to test how stressful call
centre work is, especially when considered in relation to
other jobs. And what causes stress at call centres? Is it the
need to answer calls within a specified time, and stick to a
script? Or is it the loss of control and autonomy?
Preparing the ground
The research we conducted took place in three different
call centres of a major U.K. financial institution, each
organised around a different type of business. We will
refer to the three centres as Bank-call, Mortgage-call and
Loan-call. All three shared some common features, but
they also had important differences. In all three, call centre
agents (CSAs) spent about 80-90% of the time answering
incoming calls that were mainly from external customers.
The remaining time was spent in team meetings and on
‘off-line’ administration. When ‘on-line’, CSAs could not
choose whether to answer a call or not – they had to
answer the next caller in the queue. Call times and call
quality were closely monitored by team leaders at each
site. Team leaders spent most of their time coaching
CSAs, collecting and analysing the statistics of each CSA
(e.g., the number of calls handled per hour, average
handling time), dealing with team matters, answering
customer queries and complaints and attending meetings. 
Because of the nature of the business they were
handling, Mortgage-call employees required the most
extensive product knowledge; Bank-call employees
required the least. Only one of the sites, Loan-call,
insisted that CSAs follow a call script and aim to finish a
call within a set time target. While Bank-call and
Mortgage-call did not specify an exact time, there was an
expectation that CSAs should complete a certain number
of calls per hour.
The call centres were chosen because we believed that
they were fairly representative of the different types of call
centres that exist in the U.K. It could be argued that Bank-
call typifies the ‘sweatshop’ end, with short call times, low
pay and repetitive work. Mortgage-call could be seen to
represent the ‘upper’ semi-skilled end with longer and
more complex calls and good terms and conditions. Loan-
call represents somewhere in between these two ends of
the continuum with good terms and conditions, fairly
repetitive and short calls and call scripting.
by David Holman and Sue Fernie
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Data were collected from interviews and a questionnaire
that was completed by 628 CSAs and team leaders. This
represented a response rate of approximately 80% of
those employed at the three sites. We focused on four
commonly used measures of employee well-being: job-
related depression; job-related anxiety; job satisfaction; and
general mental health. The measures of depression and
anxiety are self-explanatory. Job satisfaction covers an
employee’s reaction to job features that are integral to the
work itself (e.g., variety, responsibility) and those features
that are external to the job (e.g., pay, hours of work).
General mental health covers a person’s general feelings of
anxiety, confidence and ability to cope. We were able to
make comparisons with the experience of other types of
workers using a database of 40,000 respondents that has
been built up by the Institute of Work Psychology over the
last 25 years.
The first surprise
Contrary to much of what had been previously written
about call centres, our results revealed that levels of
employee well-being in the call centres we studied
compared favourably with that experienced by office
workers and manufacturing shop floor workers. More
specifically, we found that levels of anxiety, depression and
general mental health were similar to office and shop floor
manufacturing. In some instances, for example at Loan-call,
the level of depression was significantly lower in compari-
son with other occupations and with the other two sites.
CSAs at all three call centres also reported fairly high
levels of job satisfaction. This was particularly so at
Mortgage-call and Loan-call. At these sites CSAs generally
expressed satisfaction with their terms and conditions,
relations with their co-workers and relations between
employees and management. A staggering 76% stated
that they were satisfied with their level of pay at these two
sites. CSAs tended to be less satisfied with some of the
intrinsic aspects of their job, such as the level of responsi-
bility, variety and opportunities for promotion. 
The level of job satisfaction at Bank-call was significantly
lower. CSAs here were much less satisfied with their terms
and conditions, level of pay (here 64% said they were
dissatisfied) and the intrinsic nature of the work. These
differences were attributable to the different type of
contract used and the more repetitive low-skilled nature of
the work at Bank-call. 
Identifying the stress factors
This is not to say that working in call centres is stress free.
The second stage of our research was to identify which
factors cause stress for CSAs. Lack of employee control
over the timing of calls and the way in which they may
handle calls has often been blamed by commentators.
Many of the CSAs we studied were under pressure to
finish a call within a specified time or, if not a specified
time, were ‘coached’ if their call times were too high. Some
CSAs were also required to follow a script, limiting their
ability to vary the way in which they could talk to
customers. Other sources of stress identified in the past
have included the nature of the support offered by team
leaders and managers, the level and type of monitoring and
the type of human resource practices used e.g., payment
systems, performance appraisal, training and coaching. 
As far as job control is concerned, the results from our
research show a clear pattern. Call centre agents will
experience higher anxiety and depression, lower job satis-
faction and lower general mental health when they have
less control over their work. Specifically, CSAs who had
greater control of the timing of their calls and whose calls
were less scripted experienced greater well-being. These
results are in line with the results of other research on
stress that demonstrates a clear link between job control
and well-being. We also obtained, from the computerised
records of the call centres, the average call length for each
CSA over a three month period. Our analysis of this data
suggested that the longer the call, the less depressed and
more enthusiastic CSAs were. 
In our survey, call centre agents were asked to rate the
extent to which their team leader and managers provided
them with the support to do their job. This included
communicating what was expected of them, discussing
and solving problems, being open to constructive criticism
and stressing call quality not quantity. Again the results
clearly show that when team leaders or managers provided
proper support, CSAs experienced lower anxiety and
depression, higher job satisfaction and better general
mental health. 
Adequate coaching and training was associated with lower anxiety and depression,
higher job satisfaction and higher general mental health. 
The evidence
from our
research would
indicate that not
all call centres
are ‘sweatshops’.
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We also examined the impact of human resource practices
on well-being. We asked agents whether the level of train-
ing and coaching they received was adequate, whether
they thought the payment and bonus system was fair, and
whether their performance appraisals were useful. We
discovered that of these three practices, the adequacy of
the coaching and training had the strongest relationship to
well-being. Adequate coaching and training was associated
with lower anxiety and depression, higher job satisfaction
and higher general mental health. This association probably
reflects the fact that training and coaching increases
agents’ skills and abilities. As a consequence, this enables
CSAs to cope with the demands of the job more success-
fully. What’s more, the contribution of these practices to
employee well-being was independent of both the design
of the job and team leader and management support.
Effective coaching and training appear to be crucial human
resource practices in call centres. 
The perception that the payment and bonus system were
fair and performance appraisals were useful was also
significant for employee well-being. Our results show that it
is not the absolute levels of pay and bonuses that affect
well-being. CSAs are clearly realistic about what type of
reward they can expect for the sort of work they do: what
matters is that their pay and bonuses are seen to be fair
and equitable. Further analysis also revealed that, with
regard to these two factors, the design of the job and the
support of managers and team leaders appeared to play a
more important role than financial reward in contributing to
employee well-being. 
The Big Brother effect
We asked the call centre agents to rate the extent to which
they felt they were monitored. We also asked whether they
felt that when their calls were monitored the results were
used to punish them or used to develop their skills and
abilities. Across all three sites, CSAs felt that they were
monitored too much. But the agents also stated that, on the
whole, call monitoring was used to develop their skills and
abilities rather than used as a means to punish them. It is
perhaps because of this that CSAs often went on to point
out in our interviews with them that, although they were
monitored too much, they had nothing to be afraid of and
they did not find the level of monitoring too intrusive.
Indeed, some actually welcomed call monitoring: not only
did they see it as a means by which they could develop
their skills, but they also saw it as a fair way in which they
could demonstrate their level of competence. 
Nevertheless, a high level of monitoring was associated
with high levels of anxiety and depression, and with low
levels of job satisfaction and general mental health. The
same pattern was evident when CSAs thought that call
monitoring was used to punish rather than develop them. A
test to reveal which factor had most bearing on well-being,
suggested that the purpose of call monitoring had a more
significant effect than the actual level of monitoring. 
We also found that monitoring had by far the biggest effect
on well-being - greater than employee control, the support
offered by managers and team leaders, and the perception
of human resource practices. If call centre managers
monitor too much and use call monitoring punitively well-
being is likely to be low – even if they provide employees
with high job control, supportive managers and well-run
human resource practices. Monitoring clearly does play a
critical role in call centres. If managers get it wrong, partic-
ularly if monitoring is used punitively and not developmen-
tally, then it can have serious negative consequences on
CSAs’ well-being. 
Sweatshops or?
The evidence from our research would indicate that not all
call centres are ‘sweatshops’. The levels of depression,
anxiety, job satisfaction and general mental health we found
were no worse than in other comparable forms of work.
Indeed, in some instances, levels of depression were
significantly lower and levels of job satisfaction significantly
higher. But a degree of caution is needed in the interpreta-
tion of these results. The measures of well-being may not
capture all the different ways in which stress and well-
being might be experienced. 
More significantly perhaps, all three call-centres had
reasonably high absence rates; and Bank-call had an
extremely high turnover rate. This could mean that employ-
ees were managing their stress at work either by reporting
in sick, or, in the case of Bank-call, by leaving to go to
another job. The excellent pay and conditions at Loan-call
and Mortgage-call meant that leaving was often not a viable
option for CSAs at these places. 
Our findings appear to dash the hopes of those who love
to strike a uniformly gloomy note about modern industrial
practices. Of greater interest in the long term, however, is
our finding that certain management practices can have a
big impact on CSAs’ well-being. Our research shows that,
even within the limits of the job to be done, call centres
managers always have a choice in how they design agents’
work and how the agents are managed. Moreover, just
because information technology enables you to monitor
almost all your employees’ actions doesn’t mean that you
should. The way in which agents are monitored is probably
more important than the extent to which they are
monitored. If call centre managers want to stop their
employees from calling in sick, then they will need to
address and manage successfully the human side of call
centre work. 
David Holman is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Work 
Psychology, University of Sheffield. 
Sue Fernie is a Senior Lecturer at the London School 
of Economics and a member of the Centre for Economic 
Performance.
A high level of monitoring was associated with high levels of anxiety and depression,
and with low levels of job satisfaction and general mental health. 
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A
fter two decades of persistently high unemploy-
ment, the jobless totals in most EU countries has
finally started to decline. But progress has been
slow, and some look admiringly – or enviously – on
the ability of two economies, the UK and the Netherlands,
to bring down unemployment faster and further. If their
success is genuine, there may be lessons which other
countries could follow. But it’s important to establish first
whether the British and Dutch performance is as impres-
sive as it first appears.
Checking the facts
Figure 1 shows that in the early 1980s unemployment rates
in both the Netherlands and the UK were well above the EU
average. Not until the late 1980s did unemployment in both
Labour market performance in Britain and the Netherlands
Unemployment in the European
Union has been persistently high
since the beginning of the 1980s:
even at the end of the 1990s it
still averaged about 10% of the
working population. But Britain
and the Netherlands are reckoned
by some to have done much
better than the average. Stephen
Nickell and Jan Van Ours ask if
this is true; and if so, why?
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countries fall to the EU average; yet by the late 1990s it was
well below the average. In the Netherlands, this divergence
proceeded steadily from 1990, while UK unemployment
started to move below the EU average in 1993.
But what about employment during this period? The EU
average itself fluctuated considerably. Figure 2 shows that
on average, EU employment fell at the beginning of the
1990s and then rose again in the second half of the
decade; by the end of the 1990s the EU average was
comparable with the level seen in 1990. UK employment
moved in a similar way during this period. But employment
in the Netherlands rose throughout the decade: by the end
of the 1990s it had increased by some 15-20%. 
So how did the UK and the Netherlands do when
compared with industrial countries as a whole? If we look
at the performance of the OECD countries, we can see
that some countries, such as Austria and Norway, have
enjoyed low levels of unemployment throughout the period.
But since the early 1980s, the UK and the Netherlands are
among those countries which have shown the greatest
improvement, along with Ireland and the US. Dutch
unemployment is now below that in the US.
Getting the full picture
While unemployment rates are an important indicator of
labour market performance they may not tell the whole
story. Some countries systematically shift people out of
unemployment into other non-working categories, notably
disability and early retirement. Some believe this to be of
major importance: President Jacques Chirac of France
remarked that “if unemployment is lower in Britain than in
France, it owes no thanks to the virtues of economic liber-
alism but because the English fiddle their figures”. 
(Le Nouvel Observateur, Nov, 19-25, 1998). So we also
need to look at non-employment rates that show the
percentage of the population of working age who are not
employed. These figures basically capture unemployment,
disability, early retirement, full-time education and other
elements of non-participation, notably married women
involved in childcare.
In the Dutch case, we see a dramatic decline in non-
employment rates for the prime-age (25-54) population. But
this was from rather a high level and, in a sense, merely
reflects a convergence to the sort of levels that are
commonplace in most OECD countries outside the
Catholic countries of Southern Europe and Ireland. In the
UK, by contrast, there is no strong trend for prime-age
by Stephen Nickell and Jan Van Ours
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workers, nor, indeed, is there a particular trend discernible
for the older age group (55-64), although the non-employ-
ment rate for this group is significantly higher. The
Netherlands, however, has one of the highest non-employ-
ment rates in the OECD among older age workers, with
only a slight downward trend since the early 1980s. 
So what is going on?
To understand what’s been happening, it’s worth looking
more closely at some of these changes. There are key
differences here between men and women. In both the UK
and the Netherlands, there have been dramatic falls in the
non-employment rates of prime-age women: far more of
them now go out to work than in the early 1980s. For
prime-age men, the situation has been pretty stable in both
countries. For older workers, however, it is the men who
have seen the dramatic changes, with fewer and fewer of
them working over the last twenty years. Indeed currently,
only around 45% of Dutch men and 56% of British men in
the older age group are actually working. By contrast, the
situation has remained stable for older women. 
What’s behind the fall in unemployment?
Overall, then, it is fair to say that the UK and the
Netherlands have show a distinct improvement in their
performance. It’s not quite the miracle some would like to
think: but the decline in unemployment - by about 5
percentage points in the UK and about 7 percentage points
in the Netherlands - is far too large to be explained away by
the business cycle. So what lies behind such large falls?
Unions and wage bargaining
One important factor is the significant change in wage
bargaining arrangements in the two countries. At its peak in
1979, more than 50% of UK employees belonged to a
union. Since then it has declined dramatically and is
currently below 20% in the private sector. The Netherlands
has seen a gentle decline in union membership since the
1970s: but the main difference between the two countries
has been in union coverage, that is the percentage of
employees whose pay is determined by collective bargain-
ing. In the Netherlands, union coverage has remained
remarkably stable, going from 76% in 1980 to 81% in
1994. By contrast, in the UK it has collapsed from 70% in
1980 to close to 35% today. This dramatic fall in coverage
is unique among OECD countries. 
These changes reflect important shifts in institutional struc-
tures. In the early 1980s, the Dutch economy was in bad
shape, with unemployment well above the European
average and still rising. 1982 is considered by many to be a
turning point. In that year, under the pressure of the
seemingly endless rise in unemployment, a Central
Agreement was reached between the labour unions and
the employers’ federation. The ‘Wassenaar Agreement’
included arrangements covering wage restraint, reduction
in working hours, restoration of profit levels of firms, labour
market flexibility, early retirement and the creation of jobs.
At the same time the government agreed to get its budget
under control, reform social security and reduce taxes.
Since 1982, the Dutch union movement has been remark-
ably cooperative, explicitly moderating its wage demands.
In return there is consultation, coordination and bargaining
over all important issues of socio-economic policy between
union federations, employer federations and the govern-
ment. 
All this is in marked contrast to the UK experience. From
the mid 1960s into the early 1970s there was continually
increasing union pressure on wages. For most of the
1970s there were sporadic attempts at coordinated wage
restraint but by 1979 these had completely broken down).
In the early 1980s unemployment reached unprecendent-
edly high levels after the second oil shock. But the coordi-
nated approach seen in the Netherlands was more or less
impossible in the UK with its completely decentralised
union bargaining system - even had union leaders been in
favour of it (which, by the 1980s, they were not).
Nevertheless, the combination of Mrs. Thatcher’s tough
new legislation to reduce union bargaining power intro-
duced in the 1980s and the decline in union representation
in the private sector did, eventually, generate a significant
reduction in inflationary pressure in the labour market.
The benefits system
But changes in union power and behaviour don’t explain all
the drop in unemployment. Changes in the benefits
systems in the two countries – the financial incentives to
work - have also played an important part, especially in the
Netherlands.
In the Netherlands, a new benefit system was introduced
after the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement (see above). One of
the most important elements of the new system was the
benefit sanction. Unemployed workers may have their
benefit reduced if they don’t follow certain administrative
rules, the main aim being to increase the incentive to
search for and accept available jobs. Similar sanctions
exists for welfare benefits. In 1997-98 for unemployment
benefit recipients, the sanction rate (that is, sanctions
applied during benefit periods as a percentage of the
average stock of benefit claims) was 36% in the
Netherlands - among the highest in OECD countries (in the
UK it was about 10%). Research suggests that benefit
sanctions have a positive effect on the transition rate from
unemployment to a job.
The UK picture is less clear-cut. The benefit system has
certainly become tougher, with the important exception of
housing benefit, which pays rent and property taxes.
Housing benefits represent a substantial part of the income
For employers, part-time jobs are useful because they allow firms to allocate
more labour towards weekly peak hours in production (for example in
retailing) and because they attract a new supply of labour. 
of the unemployed, particularly for single persons in high
rent areas; and these benefits are withdrawn at a rapid rate
(65p for every £1 of net income) when they become
employed. This represents a serious work disincentive.
Furthermore, for most people, unemployment related
benefits remain available indefinitely. This tends to encour-
age long-term unemployment and the consequent persis-
tence of high unemployment after adverse shocks as the
long-term unemployed find it very hard to get back into
work. The welfare-to-work (New Deal) policies being intro-
duced by the current Labour government are designed to
counteract this problem.
Measuring the impact
Other factors which appear to have played a part in reduc-
ing unemployment in the two countries probably include
declining labour taxes and active labour market
programmes - government financed programmes to help
unemployed people find jobs. Table 1 (below) sets out
some estimates of the relative contribution of these various
factors towards the fall in unemployment. These numbers
are very rough and ready but they indicate a significant
contribution from changes in wage bargaining structure
with smaller, but none-the-less important contributions from
shifts in the tax-benefit system as well as from active labour
market policies in the Netherlands.
More women are working
The fall in unemployment isn’t the only striking change in
the British and Dutch labour markets in the past twenty
years. In both countries there has also been a sharp rise in
the number of women working. In the UK, this reflects the
steady rise in the proportion of prime-age women partici-
pating in the labour market, many of them on a part-time
basis. The participation rate of this group rose from 66.7%
in 1983 to 75% in 1998; of these around 40% work part-
time (less than 30 hours per week). It’s worth noting that
the vast majority of the part-timers choose to work part-
time (94% of them do not want a full-time job). These
changes represent the continuation of a process which
started after World War II with more encouragement from
the anti-discrimination legislation in the early 1970s.
The changes in the Netherlands were even more dramatic,
with the participation rate of prime-age women rising from
42% in 1983 to 71% in 1998, of whom no less than 68%
work part-time. This sharp increase is a combination of
several factors. For a long time a much smaller proportion
of Dutch women worked than their European neighbours,
so the rise in female participation is partly a catch-up effect.
But the removal of barriers to part-time employment have
also been important. In the Wassenaar Agreement the
unions gave up their resistance to part-time jobs, making it
possible for supply and demand to balance out. 
For employers, part-time jobs are useful because they
allow firms to allocate more labour towards weekly peak
hours in production (for example in retailing) and because
they attract a new supply of labour. Women who withdrew
from the labour market for family reasons return to take up
part-time jobs and women who would otherwise have left
the labour market altogether can instead stay on in part-
time jobs. For women, part-time jobs are useful because
they allow them to combine paid work with childcare. It is
our impression that the increase in part-time jobs has had a
positive effect on employment growth. The mere fact that
effective labour supply increased allowed many firms to
expand their business. Part-time labour is not just a redistri-
bution of a fixed amount of labour over a larger number of
workers (the ‘lump of labour’ fallacy). In the period of rapid
growth of part-time work the total number of hours worked
in the Netherlands has increased from 7.4 billion in 1985 to
8.6 billion in 1996.
While older men are leaving work
But if more women are working, the opposite is true for
men in the older age group - especially in the Netherlands.
The disability system in both countries seems to explain
much of the decline. In 1998, no less than 32% of the male
population aged 55-64 in the Netherlands were in receipt
of disability benefits. In the UK the comparable figure was
20%. This is an enormous increase in both countries: in
the early 1970s, the corresponding numbers would have
been well below 10%. 
It’s not hard to work out why the increase has been so
great. Comprehensive disability insurance was introduced
in 1967 in the Netherlands, with a benefit equal to 80% of
the previous wage. During the 1970s, the number of men
of working age drawing disability benefit rose by a multiple
of around four, not because of any rise in ill-health but
simply because entry onto the disability scheme was deter-
mined, in part, by labour market prospects. Thus, at least
half the entry onto the scheme arose directly because of
redundancy. Despite a significant tightening of the scheme
in the late 1980s, the numbers drawing benefit remain
exceptionally high even now. 
In the UK too the benefits system tends to be skewed.
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Table 1 Explaining Falls in Unemployment, 
Early 1980s – Mid 1990s. 
Percentage Point Declines
Netherlands UK
Changes in Wage Bargaining 2.8 2.7
Changes in Benefits 0.4 0.5
Changes in Labour Taxes 0.2 0.7
Active Labour Market Policy 1.1 –
Remainder (Cycle) 1.2 0.2
Total 5.7 4.1
It’s clear that both for the Netherlands and the UK falling unemployment is a
real phenomenon and not just the result of a statistical redistribution.
continued on page 31
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t’s a bizarre concept. At a time when there is almost
universal agreement on the importance of education,
both for individual well-being and for national economic
prosperity, how on earth can we think of people as
overeducated? To compete successfully in the global
economy nations must provide high quality goods and
services, produced by a highly-skilled workforce. To survive
in today’s knowledge-based society, an individual must be
well-educated, and capable of continually updating his or
her skills in a process of lifelong learning. For more than a
decade, the complaint in Britain has been of insufficient
investment in education and training. So how could anyone
argue we are investing too much? 
Of course they’re not – or at least not in the way you might
think. But there is an argument for saying that ‘overeduca-
tion’ is a serious problem in the UK; and that this phenome-
non should lead to a reassessment of the way resources
are used for education and training.
Overeducation?
As most people know, there’s been a rapid and sharp
increase in the provision of higher education in Britain.
Table 1 (overleaf) shows that in 1997 3% of the working
age population had a higher degree, more than double the
proportion twelve years earlier; over the same period the
proportion of people with a first degree went up by almost
half. Yet there has also been an increase in the number of
people who are overeducated, particularly in the 1970s
and 1980s. Overeducation means exactly what it says –
people with more educational qualifications than they need
to do their job – such as estate agents with PhDs or secre-
taries with degrees. The estate agent with a doctoral thesis
will be no better at being an estate agent than someone
with a degree; the graduate secretary will not need any of
the skills acquired on a degree course to do the job
properly. 
So is overeducation a real problem?
We have looked at evidence from a number of different
sources on the extent of overeducation in the UK. Both the
1986 Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI)
and the 1997 Skills Survey ask identical questions of
reasonably representative samples of the UK population.
In particular, the surveys ask respondents to report which
qualifications are necessary for their jobs. Comparing 
their answers with the actual qualifications that they 
hold gives a good guide to the extent of overeducation
(and undereducation). 
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 2
(overleaf). They show that a fairly consistent proportion of
the population, around 30%, appear to have been overedu-
cated in both 1986 and 1997. This figure is similar to
by Francis Green, Steven McIntosh and Anna Vignoles
Overeducation
A tough nut 
to crack
Are too many Britons overeducated? And if so, why?
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estimates for several other countries, suggesting that this is
not a uniquely British phenomenon. Earlier work in the UK
suggested a rise in overeducation in the 1970s and 1980s:
the figures in Table 2 suggest that this trend may have
levelled off in the 1990s. (It’s worth noting that Table 2 also
shows quite widespread undereducation, with 20% of the
population having a qualification lower than the one recom-
mended as necessary for their jobs.) 
The evidence mounts
We also examined the results of two other surveys, both
targeted at particular groups of people and both of which
included questions about the educational requirements of
respondents’ jobs. A 1998 survey of Newcastle University
graduates found that, amongst first degree-holders, the
incidence of overeducation was 26%. The National Child
Development Study (NCDS), which has followed a cohort
of children born in a particular week in 1958 throughout
their lives, was also helpful. The NCDS questionnaire sent
out in 1995, when the participants were 37, contained a
question about educational requirements of jobs: the
answers showed that 47% of the sample were apparently
overeducated. This comparatively high figure can be
explained by the large proportion of workers with very low
qualifications reporting that their jobs do not require any
particular qualifications at all. For example, workers with
just one CSE pass but who are in jobs requiring no qualifi-
cations would be counted as overeducated.
Overeducation or qualifications inflation?
Overeducation isn’t the same as qualifications inflation. The
latter reflects the tendency of employers to set higher and
higher qualification requirements for their employees. They
do this because they need some way of identifying high
ability candidates. As more people acquire A-levels and
degrees as a result of the expansion of higher education,
would-be employers narrow the field of suitable candidates
by increasing the entry requirements. Even if the nature of
Table 1 The % of the UK Working Age Population With Each Qualification
1985 1990 1997
Higher Degree 1.22 1.33 3.01
First Degree or NVQ5 6.73 7.12 9.34
BTEC, HNC, HND 2.10 2.37 5.00
Teaching Qualification 1.89 1.44 1.09
Nursing or similar qualification 2.33 2.44 1.99
BTEC, ONC, OND 2.06 3.24 2.52
City & Guilds – all levels 7.95 9.31 10.84
A level or equivalent 5.94 5.78 8.06
NVQ/ GNVQ level 3 – – 0.64
NVQ/ GNVQ level 2 – – 1.65
Trade Apprenticeship 7.94 10.95 5.21
O level or GCSE Grade A-C 16.22 14.51 17.67
CSE below Grade 1,GCSE below Grade C 5.56 4.15 3.09
Other professional/ vocational qualifications 4.23 10.66 10.60
No qualifications at all 34.55 25.90 18.68
Don’t know 1.29 0.80 0.60
Total 100 100 100
Note: The data used here are from the UK Labour Force Survey and are weighted. 
Each figure is the percentage of the total UK working age population with that particular qualification.
Table 2 Over- and Undereducation in the SCELI and UK Skills surveys
Under/overeducated SCELI (1986) Skills Survey (1997)
Undereducated (–1) 806 (20%) 485 (20%)
Adequately educated (0) 2040 (51%) 1189 (48%)
Overeducated (+1) 1179 (29%) 808 (32%)
Total 4025 2482
Note: These data come from the 1986 Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (1986) and the UK Skills Survey (1997). 
Individuals with
good skills who
work in jobs which
only require low
skills earn much
less than their
peers who find jobs
that do match their
skill level.
Overeducation means exactly what it says – people with more
educational qualifications than they need to do their job – 
such as estate agents with PhDs or secretaries with degrees.
the job is totally unchanged, where previously employers
might have asked for an A-level as a minimum requirement,
they might now ask for a degree.
The Newcastle University survey was particularly helpful in
making the distinction between these two phenonema. The
Newcastle alumni were asked for the qualification required
to get their job, as well as what qualifications were neces-
sary actually to do it. Qualifications inflation would show
systematic differences in the answers given to the two
questions. Yet the majority of individuals (76%) gave the
same response to both. And while 10% of the remainder
said entry requirements were higher than needed to do the
job, 14% said they were lower. The 1997 Skills Survey
showed similar results: 78% of respondents who said they
needed a degree to get their job also said that the degree
was either ‘fairly necessary’ or ‘essential’ for actually doing
the job.
Not much evidence of qualifications inflation, then, despite
the rapid increase in the supply of qualifications. This is
understandable: there is, after all, considerable evidence to
suggest that jobs are becoming more demanding, and
more skill intensive. Employers may be increasing the
educational requirements of jobs because of this. The
results of the 1997 Skills Survey, when compared with
those from the 1986 SCELI, suggest that workers are
spending more time training for their job and taking longer
to master it. The Skills Survey also suggests that the use of
computers increased between 1992 and 1997, and that
they were used in a more complex way; it also shows a
greater importance being attached to communication,
social and problem-solving skills. All of this evidence is thus
consistent with the view that job skill demands are
genuinely rising. 
So what is going on?
So there’s a paradox: jobs are getting more complex but
overeducation is still occurring. One obvious question
therefore is: does overeducation matter? Perhaps individu-
als accept jobs that aren’t commensurate with their educa-
tion and skills in the knowledge – or hope – that once they
have some experience they will progress to higher level
jobs within the organisation they work for. If so, the
evidence suggests these hopes are often dashed. Data
from a sample of 1980s male graduates reveal that the
majority of those who were overeducated in their first job
after graduation had still not moved into a graduate-level
job six years later, implying that for many overeducation is
not a stepping stone to better things.
Does any of this matter? From the evidence we have, it
certainly does for the individuals involved. The overedu-
cated seem to earn significantly less than their similarly
educated peers who have found an appropriate job for
their skills. The 1997 Skills Survey clearly illustrates this.
We classified each individual’s actual qualifications to one
of five levels, and then the level of education required for
their job to one of the same five levels. We then defined the
extent of overeducation (on a scale from 0 to 5) as the
actual minus the required education level if the former is
greater, and zero otherwise. (Similarly, the extent of undere-
ducation can be defined as the required minus the actual
education level; again if the former is greater, and zero
otherwise.) We then used this information to investigate the
effect of being overeducated on earnings. 
Table 3 (below) shows the results, given as the percentage
change in an individual’s hourly wages for each point
change in the level of over- and undereducation. The
figures are striking: the greater the extent of a person’s
overeducation, the lower their relative earnings, by a signifi-
cant amount. Thus there is a 12% reduction in women’s
wages for each point increase in the level of overeducation.
For example, if a woman holds a degree, but is performing
a job requiring only a sub-degree level qualification, she will
earn 12% less than a similarly qualified woman working in
an appropriate job. For men, the reduction in wages is
smaller, but it is still 5% for each level of overeducation.
These results are consistent with previous research that
has also found that there are substantial real wage penal-
ties associated with being overeducated.
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The overeducated seem to earn significantly less
than their similarly educated peers who 
have found an appropriate job for their skills.
Table 3 Wages of the Over- and Undereducated,
Relative to the Adequately Educated
Female Male
Overeducated –12% –5%
Undereducated 16% 12%
Note: These data are from the 1997 Skills Survey.
So why does overeducation occur?
It’s hard to see why anyone would do a job for which they
are overeducated. One explanation is, of course, simple
bad luck. In an imperfect world people may have to take a
job for which they are overqualified; and the financial (and
emotional) costs of moving jobs might then make it difficult
to change. Another, perhaps more convincing, possibility is
that not all individuals with the same level of education are
equally productive in the workplace. Perhaps the overedu-
cated are less able in some way than those with the same
education level working in a job which matches their qualifi-
cations. 
This is a hypothesis we can test, using data from the
NCDS. Besides giving us information on respondents’
education levels, this survey also provides the results of
various ability tests (mathematics and reading skills at age
16, and literacy and numeracy at age 37) which were given
to some participants. We examined these test scores to
see whether they could explain why some individuals are
overeducated and others not. The results in Table 4
(below) underline the importance of good numeracy skills
in particular in reducing the likelihood of an individual
ending up in a job for which they are overeducated. 
Each point gained on the numeracy test, for example, cuts
the chance of being overeducated by almost 2 percentage
points. 
Are we looking at the wrong thing?
So it does seem as if the overeducated are less able, on
average, than those appropriately educated for their job,
Table 5 Fields of Study by Overskilled Status
Field of study Overskilled (%) Not-overskilled (%)
Fine and applied arts 2.55 0.86
Humanities and related fields 6.25 2.15
Commerce, management and business administration 15.16 19.92
Engineering and applied sciences 14.35 21.65
Health professions, sciences and technology 11.38 16.43
Other 16.60 10.75
No specialisation 4.84 2.48
Note: data source is the British data from the International Adult Literacy Survey
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Table 4 The Percentage Point Reduction in the Probability of Being Overeducated, 
for Each Point Increase in Test Score
Age 16 Adult
Mathematics/numeracy –0.9 –1.8
Reading/literacy 0.3 0.6
Note: These data are from the National Child Development Survey
Individuals with good skills who work in jobs which only
require low skills earn much less than their peers who find
jobs that do match their skill level.
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with a lack of numeracy skills being of particular impor-
tance. This might give us a clue: perhaps the overeducated
have actually got jobs which are appropriate to their lower
skills levels. If we could measure job requirements in terms
of skills rather than qualifications would we then see that
most individuals have appropriate jobs – implying that the
labour market is successfully matching the demand and
supply for skills?
Wrong again. That isn’t what we found when we tested this
hypothesis using the International Adult Literacy Survey
(IALS). This survey measures each person’s skills, using
three tests focusing on literacy and numeracy. We first took
each individual’s average score across the three tests and
allocated them to one of four skill bands. We then used
responses to the survey’s questions about how often
participants needed to use certain reading, writing and
arithmetic skills at work. We used the responses to these
questions to measure the skills required on the job, and
again allocated the results to one of four required skill
bands. We then arbitrarily defined an individual as
‘overskilled’ if their skill level was 2 or more levels higher
than their job requirement, and similarly ‘underskilled’ if
their skill level was 2 or more levels below that required by
their job. A significant number of participants fell into one of
these two categories, particularly the former.
Even in spite of our rather arbitrary classification of actual
and required skills to the four bands, the extent of over- and
under-skilling can be shown to have real effects on individu-
als earnings, similar to that found amongst the over- and
undereducated. We found that, even taking into account the
gender, age, education level and full- or part-time status of
workers, individuals with good skills who work in jobs which
only require low skills earn much less than their peers who
find jobs that do match their skill level. For example, a
worker with very high skills (level 4) working in a very low
level job (level 1) earns £7000 a year less than a similarly
skilled individual working in a level 4 job. Not using one’s
skills can therefore have very real effects on one’s earnings.
So what is the answer?
The trail hasn’t gone entirely cold, however: the IALS does
offer some clues about the causes of overskilling (and, in
consequence, overeducation). As we noted, the actual
skills variable is a composite measure, based on numeracy
and literacy tests. We’ve already established that the
overeducated are more likely to have poor numeracy skills.
It turns out that the overskilled are also more likely to be
deficient in this respect. This finding is reinforced by infor-
mation elicited from those participants who have had some
education or training in the twelve months prior to the
survey. Table 5 (left) shows the percentage of participants
who studied in a particular subject, divided into those who
are classed as overskilled and those who aren’t. The
figures clearly show that the overskilled are more likely to
have studied subjects like arts and humanities; and corre-
spondingly less likely to have studied subjects with some
quantitative element – such as engineering, science,
business management and so on. This suggests that at
least in some non-quantitative courses, the skills being
acquired aren’t those demanded by the labour market.
Too much education?
Overeducation and overskilling are real phenomena in the
British labour market. They have real – and financially
uncomfortable – consequences for the individuals affected.
That doesn’t mean there are now too many graduates in
the UK: indeed, the figures suggest that graduate pay has
remained stable or even increased relative to the wages of
unqualified workers over the last decade or so; and it’s not
clear that overeducation has increased in recent years.
Nevertheless, the proportion of employees who are overed-
ucated remains large and should be addressed. 
Rather than reducing the number of graduates, one
solution might be to pay more attention to the mix of
subjects being studied. There has been an increase in the
demand for skilled labour, particularly related to technology
and computerisation. It should in theory be possible to
match this increase in demand to the growing supply of
skilled labour: yet the evidence suggests that this is not
happening, at least in part because those who find
themselves overeducated for the jobs they do lack the
specific skills – especially quantitative skills – to enable
them to move to other, better paid jobs. 
A word of warning though. There is a limit to which
economics can address subjects of this nature. We cannot
offer conclusive evidence which enables us to settle
arguments about the nature and extent of education. 
But we can offer a cautionary note, to ensure that the
content of education is given due weight at a time of rapid
expansion of its provision.
Those who find themselves overeducated for the jobs they
do lack the specific skills – especially quantitative skills –
to enable them to move to other, better paid jobs. 
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The work of management
theorists and practitioners like
Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor
dominated work organisation for
much of the twentieth century.
But in the past twenty years
management thinking has
undergone a revolution: High
Involvement Management (HIM)
is now widely seen as the route
to corporate success in an
increasingly competitive global
environment. Stephen Wood 
asks whether the claims made
for HIM are, given the evidence
so far, exaggerated. 
Putting the cart before
the horse
I
t’s difficult these days to avoid the jargon of modern
management. Most people have heard of flexible
working methods, teamworking, and employee involve-
ment, even if few really understand the concepts behind
these terms. High involvement management (HIM),
which encompasses all these practices (and which is
sometimes known as Human Resources Management or
HRM), is undoubtedly one of the management fashions of
the moment. Its proponents argue that it is a universally
applicable best practice model. It is central to the
argument that investment in human capital is the route to
competitiveness and economic growth and, indeed, to the
British government’s philosophy of partnership in industrial
relations exemplified in the Employment Relations Act.
No wonder then that academic research has been invigo-
rated by the development of HIM. There has been a spate
of studies, mainly in the US, aimed at testing the relation-
ship between HIM and superior organisational perfor-
mance. Claims that the evidence in favour of HIM is
accumulating steadily are now commonplace. As the
academic advocates of HIM grow more confident they
have even begun to talk about high performance manage-
ment – as if the two terms are interchangeable, so conclu-
sive do they believe the evidence to be.
How sure can we be about the management revolution?
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In my view these claims are premature and exaggerated.
High performance management might strike a chord with
many policymakers and human resource managers as
equity issues take second place to the economic effects of
management methods. But our level of understanding in
this area is limited. The conclusions which the advocates of
HIM like to draw from the research – much of which they
have themselves conducted – are not necessarily
warranted.
What is HIM?
In the first place, it’s not clear that everyone who talks of
HIM means the same thing by the term. The underlying
notion of HIM is an abandonment of the ideas of Frederick
Taylor which relied on narrow job definitions and financial
motivation. Two distinct positions can be identified – that
which focuses on job design and that which stresses the
role of performance related pay (PRP). Job design theorists
argue that what matters is the change in the way work is
organised: so that a greater emphasis is placed on enrich-
ing jobs, teamworking, functional flexibility (workers doing
different jobs according to the needs of the organisation
rather than sticking to the same job every day) and on
involving workers in innovation within the company (using
suggestion schemes, quality circles and so on). Other
writers focus on performance pay, emphasising perfor-
mance management systems – which incorporate PRP –
that are designed to ensure that workers use whatever
discretion they have for the benefit of the organisation. For
such writers, HIM means focusing workers on the
company’s bottom line.
Job design and performance related pay aren’t incompati-
ble. But many advocates of HIM are as adamant that PRP
has no part to play in their philosophy as were Deming and
others behind the development of Total Quality
Management (TQM). For them, high involvement methods
are aimed at generating greater job involvement and skill
development, with enhanced pay satisfaction playing little
or no role.
Money money money
The question of what role money does play is nevertheless
central to the controversy: specifically whether some pay
systems are better able to support HIM techniques than
others. Basing pay on the acquisition of skills (knowledge-
based pay) is perhaps the system which dovetails best with
HIM practices, although there is also a strong case for
taking pay out of the equation as far as possible by relying
on high flat salaries. Mars, for instance, has consistently
adopted this approach, preferring to offer flat salaries
which are several percentage points higher than local
rates. But excluding individual pay systems from the HIM
structure still leaves a question mark over systems not
based on the individual – company profit-sharing and
share-ownership schemes, for example, which enhance
commitment.
Does job design matter?
If worker motivation derived from the actual job (rather than
from the wages paid) is judged to be crucial in HIM it
presumably follows that trying to involve workers without
enhancing the quality of their jobs will have little or no
effect. But it may be that HIM can have at least some
impact even when jobs are fragmented and low-skilled, as
they are under Taylor’s system. Much Japanese manage-
ment falls into this latter category: group working and
quality circles are often implemented in assembly-line situa-
tions. Consequently, at the extreme, job rotation might
amount to no more than switching between one de-skilled
job and another, with off-the-job training and problem-
solving groups limited in practice to perfecting the design
of low-skilled tasks. The issue then is the extent to which
this constitutes HIM. The answer to this will ultimately be
empirical: if job redesign is the most significant ingredient
for employee commitment and performance in the HIM
package, then the impact of involvement programmes
which leave routine jobs intact will be limited. If redesign is
not the critical factor, then such programmes may enjoy the
success associated with Japanese methods. 
Uncertain linkages?
In addition to the divisions and doubts about the definition
of HIM, there are also different views on how it links to
performance. One key question is whether HIM techniques
need to be adopted as a complete package in order for the
effects on performance to be significant. The emphasis in
much human resource management literature is about the
synergistic effects: the idea that groups of management
practices hang together so that the whole effect is greater
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than the sum of the parts and superior to piecemeal
adoption of certain techniques. But if HIM practices are as
beneficial as some of their advocates claim, one might
expect that an organisation could benefit even from their
partial adoption. There is nonetheless a latent dispute
about the extent to which individual HIM techniques are
independent of each other: some imply that such
techniques can have little or no impact when used in isola-
tion. 
Best practice?
A second dispute is more fundamental. If synergy itself is
important why shouldn’t a set of practices based on
Taylor’s theories be appropriate in some circumstances?
HIM advocates are especially insistent that their methods
are always best no matter what the specific problems of
the organisation to which they are applied. But the alterna-
tive argument, that fitting management practices to specific
needs and local contexts is a valid approach, still holds
considerable sway. The implication here, of course, is that
HIM will not invariably outperform other management
techniques: where worker initiative is not needed, or where
the external environment in which an organisation operates
is stable, HIM is unlikely to offer many advantages, even if
implemented thoroughly. There may, therefore, be no
general relationship between HIM and organisational
performance.
Necessary but not sufficient
Scholars are also divided about the extent to which HIM is
a sufficient condition for corporate success. For some of
its advocates, HIM is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion: they argue that in order to reap the benefits of HIM
other factors must play a crucial role. Some, for instance,
see HIM as closely associated with TQM and ‘lean produc-
tion’ techniques, arguing that the adoption of total quality
methods is a vital ingredient for ensuring that HIM is effec-
tive. In this context, HIM can be seen as one aspect of the
ending of the trade-off between quality maximisation and
cost minimisation. There is nothing to be gained by empow-
ering and involving employees if the facilities needed to
deliver a high quality end product aren’t in place.
Another line of argument stresses the critical role of top
management in ensuring the successful implementation of
HIM. Senior executives need to value the human resources
of the organisation and support the personnel function
within the organisation. This is essential if the greater
worker involvement and higher skill base which HIM
practices develop are to be used to the overall benefit of
the organisation.
What does the research tell us?
The growing body of research on HIM unfortunately does
little to help resolve the controversies I have identified thus
far: it is inconclusive and uneven in the picture it paints. An
analysis I conducted of the major studies published during
the 1990s shows them to be limited in scope and with
varying results. Typically they tend to measure the extent to
which an organisation (this could be plant, workplace or
company, depending on the unit of analysis) is adopting
high involvement or high performance management by
aggregating their use of a set of practices, and establishing
whether there is a linear relationship between this and one
or more performance indicator. The list of practices is
generally put forward with little or no discussion of why
they were selected or of any theoretical roots. 
The groups of techniques included in the studies overlap,
but vary considerably. Particularly significant is the fact that
some studies include neither job design practices nor
performance-related pay; while some include one or the
other with few including both. Studies that assess whether
the list of practices that they focus on tend to co-exist
before examining their performance effects are the excep-
tion. They have in fact produced positive results; though
those that include both job design practices and pay
systems have not produced decisive evidence about
whether these two factors tend to be used together or as
alternatives. Nor have they been able to say whether one is
more effective than the other.
Though a fair number of the researchers argue that their
research supports the universal validity of the high-involve-
ment management, their conclusions are not always
unequivocally supported by their research evidence. Most
significantly, the effects of HIM vary between performance
measures even within one study; and some of the results
could be interpreted as supporting arguments other than
the simple universal one. Moreover, some studies support a
more contingent argument and those that examined HIM in
The danger is that the practitioners – managers – will be talked into using techniques before their
superiority has been proven and even before the principal issues have been clarified.
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conjunction with TQM show the effects of both are
enhanced when they are used together. 
The studies vary so markedly between each other that no
two studies differ simply in only one or two ways. It is thus
not possible to assess whether the different results reflect
in any systematic way differences in underlying concepts,
research designs or research sites. In addition there is not
as yet a single study which has addressed simultaneously
all the conflicting strands of the HIM argument discussed
above. If one’s arm were twisted to make an “overall”
conclusion on the balance of the evidence so far, the
strongest evidence is probably most supportive of the ‘lean
production’ argument that stresses that the effects of high-
involvement management depend very much on whether
total quality or lean production methods are successfully
installed in the organisation. But even this conclusion
would be rash. 
Jumping the gun?
Those academics who argue that evidence in favour of
HIM is accumulating are at best jumping the gun; at worst
they are guilty of encouraging glib but misleading prescrip-
tions. The research findings are conflicting, and the debate
is still in its infancy. The danger is that the practitioners –
managers – will be talked into using techniques before their
superiority has been proven and even before the principal
issues have been clarified. If the successful adoption of
HIM depends crucially on a wider series of changes includ-
ing TQM, piecemeal adoption of HIM techniques will bring
frustration among managers and could help discredit what
might otherwise be a good idea. 
This certainly happened at British Rail (BR) in the pre-
privatisation days. BR invested heavily in training station
staff to be flexible, team-oriented and customer-focused, for
the employees only to find when they stopped what they
were doing in order to answer a customer’s query about a
particular train (as they were encouraged to do by manage-
ment) they could not answer it because no systems had
been set up to provide them with relevant information!
More research is needed to clarify whether HIM techniques
must be used as a total package for them to be effective;
and if not, which techniques are most effective, work best
and in what context: and what practices bring benefits too
small to warrant the time and effort involved in setting them
up. This may seem an obvious conclusion but there is a
serious danger that the need for inclusive research which
addresses all the issues will be overlooked in the drive to
adopt HIM in the (as yet unsupported) belief that it
undoubtedly involves best management practice in all situa-
tions.
The great risk in the way the arguments for HIM are being
advanced by its advocates is that it will become part of the
conventional wisdom too quickly – that too many of the
claims being made for it will remain untested, unsubstanti-
ated, or at least insufficiently supported by the research.
From Marx onwards there has been a long tradition of
grand social theorists basing their work on the latest
writings on management and technology. Many of the latest
contributions appear to be continuing this trend. So just as
Fordism and Taylorism became common place within the
social sciences to reflect the pattern of social arrange-
ments associated with the rise of mass production, so the
term Post-Fordism has been used to give a label to what
appears to some to be a new form of society. This all
seems rather misplaced to specialists in work organisation:
whatever the social theorists like to think, the extent of
innovatory practices at the workplace level is not high and
the precise nature of their relation to Taylorism is still
unclear. Just as Lenin and others relied too heavily on
Taylor’s own writing – much of which advocated practices
which he could not even implement in the factories in
which he worked – so the post-modernists appear to be
mirroring the latest management gurus. It is a particular
cause for concern at a time when the study of the manage-
ment of work is flourishing.
From Marx onwards there has been a long tradition of grand social theorists
basing their work on the latest writings on management and technology. 
Stephen Wood is Research Chair of the Instistute for Work
Psychology at the University of Sheffield and a Research
Associate of the CEP.
Further reading: Wood, S. J: Human resource management and
performance in International Journal of Management Reviews, 
Vol. 1, No. 4, pp 367-413.
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Women’s pay
Is discrimination still an issue?
It’s thirty years since the 
Equal Pay Act came into effect in
Britain. Yet the wages of men and
women are still surprisingly different.
Joanna Swaffield asks why.
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T
he 1970 Equal Pay Act was a landmark in
the struggle to end discrimination against
women at the workplace. And there’s no
doubt that since then women at work have
achieved a great deal: there are more of
them, more of them get promoted, and they
are better paid. But in spite of the undoubted
progress that has been made, there’s still a big gap
between what men and women earn. Why should 
this be? Is discrimination still the principal cause of the
difference – or is there another explanation?
How big is that gap?
Figure 1 (below) shows the stubborn persistence of the
wage gap – what’s known as the gender wage differential.
Using data from the New Earnings Survey in the ten year
period from 1986-1996 we can see that the differential
exists at all wage levels – from the top decile (the top 10%
of wage-earners) through the middle to the very lowest
paid workers in the bottom decile. The figure shows that
the gap between men and women remained pretty
constant over the period at all wage levels. 
If we look at the five years from 1991-1996, we find that
the difference between male and female gross hourly
wages, expressed as a percentage of the female wage, is
approximately 28% at the highest decile, 23% at the
median and 19% at the bottom. This means that, for
example, the top male earners were paid 28% more than
the top female earners. It does not necessarily mean that
high earning men got more than women doing exactly the
same job.
How can the gap be explained?
There are several possible explanations for this gap –
straightforward discrimination is only one of them. Another
possibility is that women end up in jobs with low wages
and poor promotion opportunities. It could be that male
workers are more productive. Direct discrimination in the
labour market will only exist where workers, who are
equally productive, are rewarded differently. To decide
which of these factors is most important, we need first to
examine the pay differences in more detail. Men and
women may have different labour market characteristics
which might have an impact on their productivity: they may,
for example, have different educational qualifications, or
different training and on-the-job experience. It would not be
unreasonable to pay different rates to people who were
performing their task more effectively because, for
example, they had more work experience or higher qualifi-
cations than a work colleague – whatever the gender of
that worker. Only if men and women were rewarded differ-
ently for having the same qualifications or experience,
would gender discrimination exist.
Meet Mr and Ms Identical
Let’s consider two hypothetical people who are of equal
age; the same natural ability; who finished their education
at the same time with the same qualifications; and who
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Figure1 Male and female hourly wages over time (1986-1996)
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by Joanna Swaffield
working in similar firms: they are different in only one impor-
tant respect – that of work experience. The first individual,
A, has been working full-time all his working life, whereas
the second individual, B, has worked full-time all her
working life, with the exception of two years when she was
out of the labour market. Let’s also assume that each year
of labour market experience is rewarded by a 1% increase
in the wage paid by the employer, since each year of work
makes the worker more productive. It would be natural,
therefore, to expect A to have a wage approximately 2%
higher than B. This would not be gender based wage
discrimination: it would simply reflect the fact that the two
workers have (slightly) different, productively enhancing
labour market characteristics. But if A’s wage were greater
than B’s by more than 2% (and B’s ability to do the job had
not decreased while out of the labour market) this would
mean A was getting each year of labour market experience
rewarded at a rate greater than 1% (the rate we assumed
was the correct rate to reward such experience). This
would be evidence of gender based wage discrimination.
Accurate measurement of labour market characteristics is
therefore important in trying to understand why the gender
pay gap persists. Work experience is particularly important
since there is often a clear divergence between the
genders – women, for obvious reasons, tend to have less
work experience than men. But measuring work experience
is difficult – it would be necessary to interview each individ-
ual about their particular experience to build up a proper
picture and such information is rarely available. So we have
to construct a proxy for this measure: which we call poten-
tial labour market experience – the amount of time
someone could have spent at work. A fifty-year old who left
school at fifteen, for instance, can be said to have potential
work experience of 35 years. Of course, this is only a
rough approximation for someone’s actual experience: one
obvious drawback is that the fewer absences someone has
from the labour market, the more accurate will be this proxy
measure.
Just how serious this drawback is can be seen from going
back to Mr and Ms Identical. Both would have the same
potential labour market experience, since they are both of
the same age and both left school at the same time. The
proxy measure wouldn’t reveal that Ms B had left the labour
market for two years, and so we would be puzzling over
why Mr A got 2% more pay: indeed, we would probably
have attributed it to gender pay discrimination.
A source of confusion
This may all seem very technical and arcane. But there’s a
serious problem here. As we’ve noted, the difference
between actual (but difficult to measure) and potential
(easy to measure but much less accurate) work experi-
ence is going to be greatest for those people who’ve
temporarily left the labour market at some point in the
past. We also know that women have been much more
likely to have spent time away from work. Until relatively
recently, women tended only to work in the formal paid
labour market until they got married, after which many
would leave work to look after the home and family. 
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Figure 2: Comparisons of alternative labour market experience measures
All figures are shown as experience in years 
Number of individuals Female: 6,923 Male: 5,961
Potential labour market experience
Female 21.5
Male 21.4
Actual labour market experience
Female 16.6
Male 20.3
Full-time labour market experience
Female 4.9
Male 1.0
Part-time labour market experience
Female 11.5
Male 19.7
Time out of the labour market
Female 5.1
Male 0.6
It would not be unreasonable to pay different rates to people who were performing
their task more effectively because, for example, they had more work experience of
higher qualifications than a work colleague.
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Of course, this is no longer the case: but it is still relatively
common for women to leave the labour market when they
first have children and to return only when the children are
older. Men, by contrast, have tended to work continuously
(except when unemployed) from first leaving school or
university until they retired. Such stereotypical behaviour
has also changed in recent years, especially for unskilled
or low-skilled male workers who have increasingly been
forced into prolonged periods of unemployment or inactiv-
ity, as the labour market has changed. In spite of all these
recent changes, however, it’s women who remain more
likely to have spent time away from the job market and for
whom the gap between actual and potential work experi-
ence will be greatest.
The challenge, then, is to find a way of resolving this
problem so that we can properly separate out pay differ-
ences which result from different labour characteristics and
those which result from discrimination.
We can do this using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), which usefully includes detailed lifetime labour
market histories of workers. This enables us to make direct
comparisons of the alternative measures of labour market
experience – actual and potential. We can see clearly in
Figure 2 (left) that the measure of potential labour market
experience is similar for both female and male workers; but
that for women the actual labour market experience is
much lower (approximately 5 years on average) than poten-
tial experience. (It’s also interesting to note that women
have much more part-time work experience than men.)
Homing in on discrimination
All this, of course, enables us to get at the answer we’ve
been searching for: how much of the gender wage differ-
ential is a result of direct discrimination by employers? The
box below attempts to measure how much of the pay gap
can be explained by different wage rates for the same
labour market characteristics. Even when we have allowed
for actual rather than potential labour market experience,
and even when we’ve sorted actual experience into full-
time and part-time, we are still left with high figures: for all
employees, the findings suggest that 41.5% of the gap
between women and men’s pay is a result of direct gender
discrimination. When we look at full-time employees only,
that figure rises to 50%.
Pay discrimination may have been reduced but it is still
substantial. There’s also work to be done in narrowing the
gap between the different labour market characteristics of
men and women which, as we’ve seen, account for quite a
large proportion of the difference between male and female
earnings. Narrowing the gap will not be easy. Low-paid
women with children, for example, have little chance of
improving their work experience – which would, as we can
see, greatly improve their pay prospects. Much work
remains, therefore, before the aims of the Equal Pay Act
have been realised.
Low-paid women with children, for example have little chance of improving their work
experience – which would, as we can see, greatly improve their pay prospects. 
Percentage of the gender wage differential due to differences in returns to characteristics
Joanna Swaffield is a member of the CEP Labour Markets
programme.
Gender wage differential across all employees
36.5%
A 70.4% B 51.4% C 41.5%
Number of observations 12,884
Gender wage differential across full-time employees
21.7%
A 70.4% B 47.4% C 50.0%
Number of observations 10,067
The first part of this figure looks at all employees: where the
gender pay differential is such that on average men earn 36.5%
more than women. Column A uses the measure potential labour
market experience to calculate the extent to which men and
women are paid differently for doing the same job with the same
qualifications: this suggests that 70.4% of the wage gap is
accounted for by discrimination. Column B uses actual labour
market experience to make the same calculation: the percentage of
the wage gap accounted for by discrimination falls to 51.4% since
this approach enables the different labour market characteristics to
be more clearly identified. The element of discrimination falls still
further, to 41.5% when actual experience is divided into full and
part-time. 
The second part of the table shows the same calculations, this
time for full-time employees only. There is a similar but not quite so
pronounced fall in the percentage of the wage gap accounted for
by discrimination.
M
arket driven capitalism is changing in the
UK and the US. Regular workers at ASDA
and Starbucks receive stock options as
part of their pay package. Managers in
leading edge firms empower workers to
make more workplace decisions. The
unions that represent employee owners at United Airlines
hire a new Chief Executive Officer and encourage manage-
ment to reward executives partly on whether the work force
is satisfied with their jobs. The Trade Union Congress
celebrates partnerships with firms and talks about value-
added unionism. Employee pension funds based on
defined contributions own increasingly large shares of the
US equity and bond markets.
Developments like these are blurring the historic division
between labour and capital in three ways: by making
employee pay dependent on company or group perfor-
mance; by increasing the scope of employee decision-
making through employee involvement committees, teams,
and partnership arrangements with unions; and by making
employee pension funds major providers and owners of
capital. They are moving the US and UK economies toward
a form of shared capitalism in which employees and
management share financial risk and rewards and decision-
making authority.
The trend towards shared capitalism runs counter to the
widely noted rise in income and wealth inequality and the
alleged decline of permanent jobs that has marred the
economic performance of English-speaking countries. In
the US and UK, in particular, the rich, the highly skilled, the
so-called fat cats, have made off like bandits, while the
poor, the less skilled, and regular middle class workers
have struggled in the job market. To be sure, full employ-
ment has improved the position of the working poor; but if
or when these economies fall into recession, the trend
toward inequality may begin anew. Rising inequality risks
producing an “apartheid economy” with the greatest
division between haves and have nots since the Great
Depression. 
So which of these competing forces will dominate in the
future - those that lead to greater inequality or those that
lead to shared capitalist institu-
tions? With their nose for the
dismal, many economists have
examined the factors behind
rising inequality, but few have
studied the market-driven
forces toward a greater
sharing of authority, risk, and
rewards. What are the key
shared capitalist institutions?
How rapidly are they growing?
Can they become the
workplace of the future?
The American example 
Shared capitalist programs
take many forms, ranging from
employee ownership to profit-
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Shared capitalism
or apartheid economy?
Capitalism is changing, says the CEP’s Co-Director, Richard Freeman.
Here he offers some insights into how and why: and makes some
predictions for the future.
Paying workers 
in options and
bonuses may also 
be contributing 
to the boom.
sharing with no ownership to forms of gain-sharing based
on group performance. In the United States, the main
vehicle for employee ownership is the Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP). At the end of the 1990s about
7% of the private-sector workforce was employed in over
9,200 ESOPs with combined assets of $263 billion. But
apart from ESOPs, there are over 8 million participants in
non-ESOP defined contribution pension plans that hold a
total of $91 billion of employer stock. Around 9% of
employees own stock directly in their companies through
stock purchase or stock option programs. One-fifth say
their employers provide discounts on company stock, one-
tenth participate in company stock programs and two-fifths
participate in stock purchase plans. Altogether, about one-
fifth of American adults report holding stock in the
company in which they work.
But the fastest growing form
of ownership stake has been
all-employee stock option
programs (AESOPs). As
many as one-third of large
corporations in the US have
stock option plans for all or
most of their employees, with
the result that up to 7 million
American employees hold
options. The boom in options
may be a cyclical phenome-
non, spurred by the bull stock
market. But paying workers in
options and bonuses may also
be contributing to the boom,
by making pay in rapid growth
sectors more variable and
reducing wage pressures. 
Profit-sharing differs from employee ownership because it
depends on accounting profits rather than share values.
Employees at Amazon.com would receive nothing in profit
shares since the firm has yet to turn a profit, but they have
gained greatly from ownership of options, as the share
price of the company has zoomed. About one-fifth of U.S.
employees participate in some type of profit-sharing, while
just under one-third of U.S. firms have profit-sharing plans
for at least some employees. Close to two-fifths of public
firms have profit-sharing for employees. Most profit-sharing
is deferred, with the profit share put into an employee
retirement account. 
Gain-sharing plans are different again. These tend to be
more local, oriented toward cost-saving or productivity
advances in particular work sites. About two-fifths of
Fortune 1000 firms have gain-sharing plans somewhere in
the company, although most include less than 20% of
employees. Broader surveys of compensation and human
resource managers have found that only about one-eighth
have gain-sharing plans. 
Other countries are catching up
Employee ownership and profit sharing are increasingly
found in other advanced industrial countries. Between
20% and 30% of workers in France, Great Britain, Italy,
and Japan are now covered by some form of profit sharing,
while smaller numbers have some kind of employee stock
ownership. Across the European Union, between 5% and
43% of firms within each country have profit-sharing plans,
between 1% and 22% have employee share ownership,
and between 5% and 38% have team-based bonuses. 
Outside the firm itself, the growth of pension fund
(workers’ capital) ownership of equity has made the bulk
of the American work force part-owners of enterprises
other than their own. The shift from defined benefit
pension plans to defined contribution pension plans has,
moreover, made retirement income and wealth more
dependent on share ownership than ever before. The risk
from pension fund investments no longer lies with employ-
ers, but with workers. 
Employee involvement 
Similarly dramatic changes have occurred in the area of
decision-making. Employee involvement committees,
teamwork, and other forms of empowering workers have
become the cutting edge of labor relations in the US.
British management has been more sceptical of these
forms of labor relations, but European-style works councils
are now coming to most large British firms. In the US, one-
third of workers in firms with over 50 employees report that
they serve on employee involvement committees. They
make more suggestions at their workplace than other
employees, and management reports that their suggestions
are more useful. Workers who serve on committees are
more committed to their firm, are less likely to support
unionization if they are in a nonunion workplace, and are in
general happier with their work lives. 
CentrePiece Spring 2000 25
Economics predicts 
a close link between
employee participation
in decision-making 
and sharing in 
financial rewards. 
by Richard Freeman
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Economics predicts a close link between employee partici-
pation in decision-making and sharing in financial rewards.
Combining financial participation with employee involve-
ment in decision-making can be highly effective in generat-
ing a sense of ownership and partnership, encouraging
worker co-monitoring, and tapping ideas and skills to
enhance workplace performance. Give the typical
employee authority to make a decision and the incentive to
increase company value, and he or she will act in the firm’s
and their own best interest. By contrast, workers with
decision-making authority but no financial incentive ought to
be less motivated to make the right decisions. And there is
little rationale for a firm to share financial returns with
workers if all they do is carry out orders from above. In
fact, there is a strong positive association between
employee involvement and financial sharing. Firms which
are employee owned, which pay bonuses, which have
gain-sharing programs, or ESOPs, are more likely than
others to have employee involvement programs as well. 
Why has shared capitalism grown?
To some extent shared capitalist institutions have been
artificially spurred by the tax system. In the US, ESOPs
have benefited from a number of tax breaks; there are tax
incentives for pension funds; and firms report stock options
differently in their accounting statements than other
expenses. Tax advantages spurred the growth of profit-
related pay in the UK. But in neither country have tax
breaks been the dominant cause of change. The UK has
now removed its profit-related pay tax advantage while the
US terminated many ESOP tax incentives; the major
remaining tax incentive is that company owners can avoid
capital gains taxes on shares sold to an ESOP. Deferred
profit-sharing and pension plans that give workers owner-
ship stakes in their firm have employee taxes deferred until
the funds are received at retirement, but in this respect
they do not differ from other pension plans. There are
almost no special tax incentives for profit sharing, or gain-
sharing. In Japan, ESOPs have grown rapidly without any
tax advantages at all.
What has spurred the growth of shared capitalism has
been that it seems to meet the market test. Firms with
more shared arrangements do a bit better than other firms.
Workers embrace the new modes of payment and their
enhanced role in decision-making. Studies show a positive
relation between the various forms of shared capitalism and
output (though with a wide range of results). Profit-sharing
is associated with a productivity advantage of 4-5%;
employee ownership raises productivity by less, with gains
that are largest for smaller firms. Employee involvement
programs have even smaller and more variable effects, and
seem to work best in union settings. Most case studies find
that gain-sharing has positive effects on group perfor-
mance. On the workers side, the vast majority of American
employees want more involvement and a greater say in
company decisions that affect their workplace. Some want
to participate in decisions as individuals, but the majority
seek some form of collective voice. Some want unions to
represent them, but many want organisations that are less
likely to conflict with management. By providing workers
with the work arrangement they want, firms can create a
more loyal and satisfied work force, irrespective of produc-
tivity effects. 
In the UK, the TUC sees the creation of works councils as
an opportunity to service employees better, rather than as a
substitute for unions. By contrast, the AFL-CIO is very
uneasy about any non-union form of representation. Many
workers in the US desire to own a bit of their firm, and the
young MBAs and technically-trained employees whose role
is critical to the success of the high-tech sector regard
working without a share of ownership as unacceptable,
presumably because it limits the potential for attaining great
wealth. Of course, if the stock market collapses for high-
tech and the various dot.com companies, the idea that
workers should get some of the action while bearing the
risk might prove to be a speculative bubble; but even in
earlier times, employees expressed some interest in
gaining a share of the rewards from their firms’ successes.
In short, shared capitalist institutions are growing because
they meet the test of the competitive market, not because
government has tilted the playing field in their favour. 
Puzzles
But there are some puzzles in the economics of shared
capitalist institutions. First is the rationale for the most
rapidly increasing form of pay – stock options for regular
employees. It’s one thing to pay the CEO of ASDA or
Starbucks in stock options since their decisions can affect
the share price, and give them strong incentives; but assis-
tants at your local supermarket can hardly affect the share
price, which make this a peculiar way to try to motivate
them to perform better. Gain-sharing based on meeting
targets or profit-sharing at the local store level would seem
to be more rational. But AESOPs are growing rapidly. The
only plausible explanation (aside from firms simply getting it
wrong) is that options do something that goes beyond
individual calculations, notably to help create a corporate
culture that improves company performance. Evidence from
experimental economics and psychology (for instance on
prisoner dilemma games) show that one cannot dismiss the
culture hypothesis as irrelevant or the result of fuzzy think-
ing. Sorry, Lady Thatcher, but there really is society - or at
least many firms act as if there is and many experiments
confirm that people are more than selfish maximisers.
The second puzzle is why so many workers prefer some
ownership stake or share in profits to fixed wages and
benefits. To be sure, workers in most shared capitalist
arrangements receive market wages and benefits compara-
ble or even a bit higher than those in other firms, so they
tend to have a reasonable base standard of living, but many
invest more in their firm when portfolio theory says they
What has spurred the growth of shared capitalism
has been that it seems to meet the market test.
should diversify. And in larger firms workers could presum-
ably demand higher wages in lieu of the more variable
shared forms of pay, as Saturn car workers in the US have
recently done. But many young educated workers make
the opposite demand – for some share of the action from
their employer. What began as a mode of pay for small
Silicon Valley start-ups that could not meet the pay
packages of larger firms (“IBM pays more, so we offer
some ownership”) has spread throughout the high-tech
sector and to many other industries as well. The positive
response of workers calls for some rethinking of the tradi-
tional view of employees as risk averse and firms as risk
neutral.
A third puzzle is why firms have sought to shift their
pension plans from defined benefit schemes to defined
contribution schemes, when the vast majority have done
quite well with defined benefits, being able to under-fund or
over-fund the pensions depending on market conditions.
While in the short run, firms may benefit from reducing risk,
in the long term, they would seem to be giving up the
potential for gains from booming equity markets. Most
actuarial calculations for pensions are, after all, relatively
conservative, and firms that control a defined benefit plan
gain the profits from better than expected performances. 
Continuing growth?
Shared capitalism will grow if it continues to meet the
market test, producing better outcomes for firms and
workers than more hierarchical worker/firm relations. In the
high-tech sectors, it is difficult to see how sharing in finan-
cial outcomes and decision-making will not remain signifi-
cant. Since these are growing sectors, the shared
approach will become more important in the overall
economy. With young educated workers having technical
skills and the desire to take a chance with entrepreneurial
risk, and with many firms having a highly risky future, it is
hard to see how any other mode of operation would better
meet the needs of both sides. 
In other sectors, those which make up the bulk of the
economy, the future is uncertain. Many firms believe that
flexibility in the labour area is critical for success in a global
economy. Some seek flexibility by downsizing their opera-
tions and using temporary help agencies. It is, they say, the
end of the job: virtual employees working at virtual
workplaces. But shared capitalist institutions offer an alter-
native form of flexibility based on permanent employment.
What is variable is not the job but the compensation, which
will depend on the performance of the firm. 
I expect that variable compensation through shared capital-
ist arrangements rather than variable employment will prove
to be the more effective road to flexibility. If we were
moving to the end of the job, you should expect the number
of years employees stay with the same employer to drop.
But it hasn’t. On average, tenure with a firm both in the US
and the UK has been relatively constant, falling a bit for
less educated young men and rising for women. If we were
moving toward the disposable employee, workers would
not be particularly interested in getting training from their
firm. But most employees seek long-term jobs with oppor-
tunities for upgrading their skills, and many temporary
workers and agencies operate in part as a means for train-
ing and testing future permanent workers. 
Of course, a collapse of the shares market and a major
recession could greatly alter employee attitudes and bring
about demands for more stable pay and lead more firms to
go the downsizing route. But even such a development is
unlikely to reverse the rising proportion of equities owned
by employee pension funds. Shared capitalism will not
solve the inequality problem by itself. Some less educated
and less skilled workers may fall into a low-level contingent
status, and will need social programs to improve their living
conditions. But it will create a different form of capitalism in
the foreseeable future. Not a vague third way based on
diverse stakeholders, but a firm based alignment of
employee financial interests and influence on decisions.
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In the high-tech sectors, it is difficult to see
how sharing in financial outcomes and
decision-making will not remain significant.
Richard Freeman is Co-Director of the CEP and Professor of
Economics at Harvard University.
Most employees
seek long-term
jobs with
opportunities 
for upgrading
their skills.
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O
ne of the striking features
of the world at the end of
the twentieth century was
the extent to which ordinary
people were seeing their lives
transformed by high technology. No
longer is the weightless economy the
preserve of rocket scientists or
academics in ivory towers: more and
more people are now buying books
from Amazon.com, ordering rail or air
tickets on-line and discovering the
benefits of electronic mail. There’s no
doubt that the early years of our new
century are going to see an
acceleration of the trends, right
across the globe. That’s inevitable.
But is it also worrying for an
economy like Britain? Or should we
embrace the new revolution
enthusiastically? 
Growth and development:
just the facts
Given fears about where Britain
stands in the globalised technology-
driven world, it is easy to forget the
central role each has played for the
other in world history. At the
beginning of the 20th century, Britain
stood alone among economies in
being relatively industrialised. It was
here after all that the Industrial
Revolution began, here that abolition
of the Corn Laws precipitated the
world’s move towards lower trade
barriers and brought about the
explosion of merchant trade across
national boundaries. Towards the end
of the 19th century, a hundred years
after the Industrial Revolution, most
other countries still employed over
30% of their workforce in
agriculture. In Britain, by contrast,
cotton from abroad provided the raw
inputs on which fed the textile
machines and hydraulic power that
we associate with leading-edge,
frontier technologies then. Other
countries were better at producing
raw material inputs; the British better
at processing them. This international
division of labour – a then-new
Danny Tyson Quah
At the start of the twenty first century, Danny
Quah considers the implications of the new
technological revolution.
In whose interest?
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organisation of production on that
panoramic a scale – made sense,
and provided the foundations for high
and growing economic prosperity in
Britain. Some economic historians
estimate that, taking into
consideration spillover effects, cotton
imports might have accounted for
between 15% and 60% of overall
British economic growth over the
first half of the 19th century. No one
then lamented the British economy
would not survive locating cotton
production offshore – or at least if
anyone did, I’m glad their arguments
failed to carry the day.
Capital flowed freely from the core
of rich countries of Western Europe
to the developing economies in the
Americas, Asia, and Australia. The
net outflow from Britain rose to as
high as 9% of GNP. By contrast,
even at their maximum in the 1980s,
net capital outflows from Japan and
Germany never exceeded 5% of
national output.
Looking over these facts we have
to conclude that for one and a half
centuries after 1750, Britain was
more than a fully signed-up partner
of the globalising world: indeed, it
was instigator and gang-leader.
And remember, the words
“Industrial Revolution” and “Britain”
are practically synonymous.
Historical accounts draw no
distinction between the Industrial
Revolution of the late 18th century
and the expansion of British industry
under Richard Arkwright, Matthew
Boulton, and James Watt. Moreover,
the great technological advances in
Britain did not just begin and end in
1800. For the century afterwards,
British workers and machines
extended the application of new work
ideas to France, Belgium, the
German states, Sweden,
Switzerland, and ultimately to the
eastern US. Over 100 million people
– 14% of the world’s population –
migrated across continents in the 50
years before World War 1.
This quick historical survey shows
that neither globalisation nor
technological change is new to
Britain. It reveals nothing in the
British character or in its culture
averse to international openness,
technological innovation, individual
entrepreneurship, or productivity and
enterprise. Indeed 19th-century
Britain positively thrived in all these
dimensions.
More recently? For the 30 years
after 1960, per capita income for the
entire world grew by 2.26% per
year. Corrected for purchasing
power parity, UK per capita income
only exactly kept pace. At both the
beginning and end of this period, UK
per capita income was 3 times that
the world average: averaged over the
1970s, however, this ratio had fallen
to as low as 2.73, climbing again
only after 1981. But keeping level
with an average is only relative.
Averaged over the first five years of
the 1960s, the UK ranked 9th in the
world in per capita income across
countries; towards the beginning of
the 1990s, that same average
showed the UK’s rank had fallen to
15th. Over these same three
decades, not only has aggregate
performance been dismal, but UK
income inequality also increased by
over 13%. This increased inequality,
to be clear, cannot be traced to low-
wage competition from less-skilled
workers in poorer economies: the
relative prices that have declined
most are those of goods that use
skilled labour more intensively.
Imports from the poorer developing
countries have had no measurable
direct impact on wages or
employment in the UK.
Technology:
changes large and small
What has changed in these last 200
years? More important, how will the
situation evolve from here on out?
What is the modern-day counterpart
to the steam engine and cotton
imports, to the abolition of the Corn
Laws, and to the Industrial
Revolution that all together so
magnificently drove British and world
economic growth?
The old saw, that knowledge
drives technological progress and
through that economic prosperity, is
as legitimate now as it was then. 
For these forward-looking
questions we can only use
conjecture, hypothesis, and
reasoning. As economists, we
analyse models, based on informed,
maintained hypotheses, that attempt
to draw out the implications of our
guesses. So here’s my stab at
answering the list of questions,
extrapolating from observations about
changes in the world now.
The newest and most profound
global and technological changes
have two key characteristics: first,
they imply ever-increasing disrespect
of distance (and thus space), time,
and other putative natural
boundaries; second, they
progressively tear down the barriers
between producers of new
technology and consumers. These
effects work as powerfully across
countries as they do between
neighborhoods in a city or villages in
the countryside.
Falling transportation and
communications costs is a
convenient shorthand to describe the
first of these: Technical progress on
Internet and telecommunications
infrastructures is a case in point. For
this description to work, however, it
must be that the economic value
we’re interested in moving displays
no hard physical limits in its
transportation and communication.
However much transportation costs
fall, however low tariff barriers
become, if it’s an oil supertanker
we’re slinging back and forth, that’s
going to eat up real resources. By
contrast, where such physical limits
do not apply, it is useful to think
about the economic value as being
weightless. Examples include
modern finance and financial
At the beginning of the 20th
century, Britain stood alone
among economies in being
relatively industrialised.
For one and a half centuries
after 1750, Britain was more
than a fully signed-up partner of
the globalising world.
services, software and other
elements of information and
communications technology,
electronic libraries and databases,
media content, and intellectual
property broadly construed. It is
these parts of the economy to which
falling transportation costs apply; it is
then their rising importance in a
modern economy that allows falling
transportation and communication
costs to matter at all.
The same circle of ideas helps
shed light on the ever closer
proximity of technology-producers
and consumers. Most of what we
buy and enjoy now has large chunks
of technology embodied in ever less
physical material. Time was, high-
tech meant a faster, more whizz-bang
spinning jenny pushing out better
textiles that in turn got reworked into
higher-quality clothes. Now, high-tech
means the clothes, the software, the
video content, the Internet delivery
themselves directly encode the
improved knowledge and
information. It is that knowledge and
information that we now value; their
carriers are inessential and
immaterial.
This identification sheds light on a
number of important developments in
the modern globalised economy.
One, the knowledge-driven
economy is real and is here. This
knowledge in economic life, however,
is not always identical with the
knowledge in science and
technology. Lara Croft Tomb Raider
is a weightless knowledge-product
that we enjoy. Its economic and
physical properties make it a
prototypical product in the new high-
tech knowledge-intensive economy. It
is, however, a different animal
altogether than a mathematical
theorem or a scientific or engineering
breakthrough. It is not knowledge
that comes out of an R&D laboratory,
at least not in the traditional sense.
Two, this move towards a
weightless economy implies for
business firms outsourcing and
downsizing in the small but,
simultaneously, agglomeration in the
large. Because the distance between
production and consumption is ever
smaller, individuals with enterprise, a
good idea, and not much else can
have a go: reaching a market for
their ideas no longer needs to be
mediated through expensive
largescale bricks-and-mortar
operation. The comparison is with,
on the one hand, hawking one’s
good ideas to, oh, the two or three
businesses large and interested
enough to want to implement them,
or, on to the other hand, to the two
or three hundred million consumers
waiting on the other side of the
Internet. Getting a penny off each of
even a fraction of such a customer
base, from one’s special customised
niche idea, will already do nicely.
Thus, every week we hear of yet
another rags-to-riches Internet
business.
At the same time, however, the
network externalities and scale
economies in servicing global
markets for these new high-tech
products make large conglomerates
with truly international reach the
operation of choice. Software and
cable companies,
telecommunications firms, banks,
even staid old-fashioned ivory-tower
academic universities, all in the
weightless economy business, seek
to operate or cooperate at ever
larger scales. Evidently, there is room
for successful enterprise at different
magnitudes of operation, large and
small, but leaving out the soggy
middle.
Where does national policy-making
situate in this canvas? Governments
and nation-states, in my view, face
much the same choices as do firms.
Either cooperate internationally, and
exploit the network externalities and
scale economies from coordinating
global reach; or operate in a niche,
customising, identifying, and serving
specific interests. 
Conclusions 
The world now, however, has
changed. 
The key features of the new
technological revolution are an
increased disregard for distance,
time, and other putative boundaries;
and an increased proximity between
technology and the consumer.
History has no record of anyone
ever successfully holding back the
tide of commercially-profitable
technical progress or ever
successfully closing off their society
and economy to external influences.
The opposite, instead, is how almost
all economies have succeeded.
Identifying and then leveraging one’s
comparative advantage, rather than
fearing these changes, should be the
way forwards. Nothing, not even the
continuing technological and
economic dominance of the US
should be taken for granted. In the
early 1990s, Finland’s national
income fell by a magnitude
comparable to that experienced by
many countries during the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Today,
observers acknowledge that,
compared to Finland, Silicon Valley
is, to use the vernacular, a Third
World country in its use of advanced
technology. If all that Britain had to
choose between was Finland or
Silicon Valley, then I’d say we’re in
pretty good shape. 
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The key features of the new
technological revolution are
an increased disregard for
distance, time, and other
putative boundaries; and an
increased proximity between
technology and the consumer.
Most of what we buy and
enjoy now has large chunks of
technology embodied in ever
less physical material.
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Disability benefits tend to be higher and more secure than
unemployment benefit, since there is little pressure to take
up work. What’s more, those who work in the Employment
Service have an incentive to shift unemployed individuals
onto disability schemes, particularly if they are hard to
place in work - the unemployment figures are then lower
than they otherwise would have been. It is clear from a
report on disability by the National Audit Office in 1989 that
a variety of non-medical factors are taken into account by
doctors involved in disability assessment - including
whether or not a claimant had been advised by the
Employment Service to seek a statement of disability. As a
consequence, despite the relatively buoyant labour market
after 1993, the numbers in receipt of disability benefit
continued to increase. In the Netherlands, there’s also a
generous government-subsidised early retirement scheme
which appears to increase the rate at which older Dutch
men leave the labour market.
Lessons to be learned?
Whatever President Chirac may say, it’s clear that both for
the Netherlands and the UK falling unemployment is a real
phenomenon and not just the result of a statistical redistrib-
ution of non-employed workers from unemployment to
other categories. Since in most other EU countries such a
decline in unemployment did not occur to the same extent,
it is therefore fair to describe what happened as something
of an unemployment miracle. Both countries have seen
significant changes in wage bargaining structures; and
their unemployment benefit systems have become
markedly less generous along with an increased pressure
to take jobs. But the Netherlands has combined these
changes with an increase in expenditure on active labour
market programmes to help the unemployed, which
contrasts with a significant decline in such programmes in
Britain, at least up until 1996.
The success of both countries in bringing down unemploy-
ment from the disastrous heights of the early 1980s is a
significant achievement - though some other aspects of the
operation of their labour markets are less praiseworthy,
notably the disability system. So are there lessons which
other European countries could follow? We think there are
two principal ones:
reform wage bargaining systems: both countries have
successfully reduced the upward pressure on pay which
wage bargaining systems can generate, especially in tight
labour markets: the Netherlands did this by greater central
coordination, the UK through a weakening of the power of
unions;
reform benefits systems: benefit reform in both
countries has helped them to sustain lower levels of
unemployment; they have reduced benefits and made work
tests stricter. Active labour market programmes, introduced
by the Dutch and now being introduced in Britain, are an
important complement to this. 
But there’s a negative lesson here too: disability and
sickness benefit systems must be kept under control with
stringent entry criteria. The huge rise in the numbers claim-
ing disability benefit in both countries did not correspond
with any rise in ill-health. The Dutch now seem to have
halted the rise, but disability numbers in Britain are still
increasing. The experience of the 1990s offers plenty of
evidence about the need to resist the temptation to reduce
labour supply as a policy response to unemployment.
Mirage or miracle
Continued from page 9
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February 2000 saw the official launch of an
exciting new project for the CEP: it became
host to a brand new Centre for the Economics
of Education. This is a government funded
research centre, with money (nearly £1
million) coming from the Department for
Education and Employment. The new Centre
is a partnership between the CEP itself, the
Institute for Education and the Institute for
Fiscal Studies, as Stephen Machin, Director of
the new Centre, and Anna Vignoles, its
Coordinator, explained to CentrePiece. 
What will the new centre do?
What will the new Centre do?
We’ll bring together experts from both
the education and economics fields to
look at the really pressing economic
issues currently facing the UK
education system – how do we
improve the cost effectiveness of our
schools? What types of education are
of most benefit to individuals when
they start work? How should we
decide how much the government
should invest in education – and what
sort of education programme the
government should spend money on. 
One of the things that makes the new
Centre different and exciting is that it
will be truly multi-disciplinary. It’ll be a
three-way partnership between the
Centre for Economic Performance, the
Institute of Education and the Institute
for Fiscal Studies. The idea will be to
provide the people who are providing
the money – the Department for
Education and Employment – with
guidance for drawing up education
policy. We are also going to undertake
groundbreaking methodological work.
In other words, we’re going to be
developing methodologies that will set
the standard – the‘best practice’ – for
all researchers working on the
economics of education. We aim to do
this by bringing together the best of
the research techniques currently used
by educationalists and economists. 
Why have a separate Centre?
The idea behind having a separate
Centre, dedicated to studying the
economics of education, is to focus a
great deal of academic expertise on
one particular policy problem. We will
have educationalists and economists
all working together, using the
methodologies of their own fields, and
drawing on the existing expertise of the
various institutions that are involved in
this new Centre. Because the new
Centre is going to provide a focal
point, and have new resources, we
should be able to come up with better
and robust results, more quickly. 
Why is the government so keen to
fund this type of research?
When this government was elected
their message was ‘education, 
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education, education’. Indeed
politicians right across the political
spectrum seem to generally agree on
one thing: that our education system
is central both to the UK economy
and to our society as a whole. The
UK education system must provide
the skills that employers need –
desperately: and it must also give
individuals the means to achieve more
both for themselves and for the
economy as a whole. Expenditure on
education is – partly at least – an
investment, an investment made by
the country as a whole. So it’s crucial
that we understand more about which
types of investments in education are
going to be more effective in
achieving our economic and social
goals. It’s understandable that the
government wants to encourage 
more research – and rigorous
research at that – that can shed light
on these issues.
What specific areas of work will the
new Centre focus on?
We’re going to start out with a
comprehensive programme of
research over the next three years. In
year 1, the priority research areas will
be research into how we can improve
the cost effectiveness of UK schools.
We’ll work on the types of skills that
are most in demand by employers.
And we’re going to do in-depth
analyses of the pay-off to the
individual from different types of
education: we’re particularly
interested in analysing the economic
benefits individuals get from having
FE qualifications. 
What can this sort of research tell
us? Will it just look at the way things
are or give guidance for policy?
The new Centre offers a fantastic
opportunity to feed rigorous research
straight to the people who actually
decide the policies: so we can make
sure that the decisions being made
about government investment in
education are going to be made on
the basis of the best evidence
available – that’s the whole idea of
having a DfEE funded centre. The
DfEE will have access – through us –
to first class research. And it’s a two
way thing. It’ll be just as important
that the policymakers can guide us,
the researchers, as to the areas
which are most pressing, most
urgent, in policy terms. This kind of
two-way relationship between
researcher and policymaker should
mean that the work that the new
Centre will do gives relevant guidance
for future policy – and does so at the
right time. We see the Centre as
being about providing ideas to create
the education system that we all
ideally want, rather than simply
describing the way that the system
works at the moment.
When will the research start to
make an impact?
Almost straightaway! Policymakers
will have access to our research from
day one and they’ll be guiding us as
to the issues of greatest concern.
Throughout the life of the Centre, the
DfEE will have access to our findings
and to our researchers at their finger
tips and this should start to impact on
policy decisions relatively soon – we
expect to see a visible impact within
six months. But the real advantage of
the Centre is that, thanks to the
funding we’re getting from the DfEE,
we will also be able to take a longer
term, much broader perspective. So
more major and lengthy projects will
be possible which, over the next 5
years or so, should pay off in terms of
better policy decisions.
Expenditure on education is –
partly at least – an investment,
an investment made by the
country as a whole.
The new Centre offers a
fantastic opportunity to feed
rigorous research straight
to the people who actually
decide the policies.
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
HOUGHTON STREET LONDON, WC2A 2AE
Tel: 020 7955 7798   Fax: 020 7955 7671   
Homepage: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/ Email: centrepiece@lse.ac.uk
C E N T R E  f o r  E C O N O M I C  
P E R F O R M A N C E
E.S .R .C
ECONOMIC
&  S O C I A L
RE S E A RC H
C O U N C I L
The back issues
